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ABSTRACT
The National Programme for Information Technology is the largest civil IT programme
worldwide at an estimated cost of £6.2 bn over a ten-year period. Launched in 2002, it provides
an opportunity for the IT service industry to develop business models in the UK healthcare sector
in which, historically, has seen low investment in IT services. Nearly four years on—and under
pressure from government and senior hospital managers to deliver working systems—the
relationship between public sector organisations and private sector firms is once again under
increasing scrutiny. All the IT systems are late and over-budget with vendors either leaving the
programme or re-negotiating their contracts with Connecting for Health, the government agency
which runs the National Programme for Information (National Programme).
In this study, we investigate the role of IT vendors in fulfilling the aims and objectives of the
National Programme in the context of market, business, managerial, and technical factors.
Despite highly publicised large-scale IT outsourcing contracts, many IT vendors are unable to
fulfil the rigid terms and conditions of their contracts. Our findings suggest the reasons are
complex, but shortcomings in vendor capabilities, contractual terms and conditions, financial
pressures and poor governance arrangements have led to slow progress and even resistance to
the National Programme.
KEYWORDS: Vendor Management, National Programme, Public Sector, Healthcare IT, NHS
INTRODUCTION
The UK National Health Service (NHS) was set up in 1948 to offer free healthcare at the point of
delivery to all citizens. Since then, the NHS has rarely been out of the public eye. The current
debate by politicians, the media and citizens is about the allocation of the £70 billion annual NHS
public spend (Wanless Report, 2002). The annual spend on computer systems and services by
UK government have doubled since 1999, reaching a figure of around £14bn, representing the
highest in Europe (NAO, 2004). This increase has been accompanied by the growing use of large
external IT service providers, and smaller, more specialised firms (Table 1) who see great
potential in developing skills and capabilities in the healthcare sector (Wyatt, 1998). The split
between public (in-house) and private (external) markets for IT services now stands at around 55
and 45 per cent respectively.
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Yet the history of introducing ICT into the NHS has produced mixed results (NAO, 2004; 2006).
From an information intensive organisation with virtually no computers in the 1960s, the NHS
now has tens of thousands (Brennan, 2005). One of the first computer systems was the Patient
Administration System (PAS) introduced in the 1960s. This was followed by several different
systems in the 1970s (laboratory), in the 1980s (management systems), in the 1990s (IT strategy
like electronic patient records (EPR), electronic record development and implementation
programme (ERDIP) and electronic health records (EHR).
Against a background of relative under-investment in ICT over three decades, the government
pledged in 2002 to spend around £6.2 bn1 on a National Programme for Information Technology
(National Programme) to deliver four critical elements:
1) NHS Care Records Service
2) Electronic Appointment Booking
3) Electronic Transmission of Prescriptions, and
4) IT Infrastructure and Network.
The key objective of the National Programme is, ‘To deliver a 21st century health service that is
better for patients, citizens, clinicians and people working in the NHS through the efficient use of
information and communication technology’ (Granger, 2004).
As a longitudinal study on the vision and implementation of the National Programme covering
the period 2001-2005, this research analyses data collected from 120 interviews with clinicians,
hospital managers, IT suppliers and relevant healthcare agencies and groups. Developing a
theoretical framework using concepts from outsourcing theory, we present a practical and
systematic overview of some key vendor issues, exploring and highlighting management
implications where appropriate. By discussing these issues systematically from a management
and practical perspective, the paper contributes to the ongoing debate surrounding the apparent
slow progress with the National Programme, thus bridging the gap between theory and practice
and seeking to offer useful information to colleagues researching on the NHS.
This paper first presents our conceptual framework, which develops ideas from the literature on
global IT sourcing. Next, we discuss our methods of data collection and analysis. We then
present our research findings from data collected from more than a hundred respondents,
including hospital managers, clinicians, and vendors supplying IT services to the NHS. Finally, it
draws conclusions from the data and offers ideas and directions for future research in the health
sector using vendor management analysis.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Since the early 1980s, the UK NHS has increasingly looked towards the private sector to provide
IT services using a range of outsourcing contracts (Currie & Guah, 2007). The success of public
sector outsourcing contracts, however, has mixed results, with many high-profiles ‘IT failures’
1

This figure does not represent the whole cost of National Programme and is largely confined to the technical
requirements of the various systems.
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occurring. These include, Wessex Health Authority, the London Ambulance Service, the Child
Support Agency (CSA) and the Passport Office. To avoid such disasters, the UK government
developed ‘Gateway Reviews’ which were intended to monitor and evaluate IT projects at
various critical stages in their development (NAO, 2004). While such rational approach reflects
the theory espoused in numerous project management textbooks, there appears to be little
evidence that this formulaic approach has worked in practice. On the contrary, the IT system
introduced in the CSA passed the various Gateway Reviews only to be scrapped in 2006 when it
became clear the system was unlikely to work. This led to the restructuring of the CSA.
So against a background of mixed success with public sector IT projects, how will the National
Program for IT apply some of those lessons learned from previous projects to mitigate risk in IT
outsourcing contracts? Our literature review suggests a shortage of work on vendor IT contracts,
with the majority of studies focusing upon the client side. However, some of the recent work
covers a range of issues that need to be taken into consideration by vendors and clients when
negotiating and managing IT outsourcing arrangements. We therefore combine four critical
issues relevant for analysing the National Programme.
Supplier Diversity and Capabilities
The Wanless Report (2002) showed that IT spends around £1000 per employee in healthcare
compared with around £9000 in financial services. While these statistics invite many questions
about validity and relevance, they convinced policy-makers that more investment in healthcare IT
was needed. Yet low investment in IT services since the mid-1960s suggests that few IT vendors
have developed the appropriate capabilities and skills to serve the needs of complex healthcare
organisations. The IT outsourcing market, which has expanded globally over the past twenty
years has witnessed heightened activity in financial services, manufacturing and retailing, but not
healthcare. The extent to which private sector templates are useful for understanding and
application of IT in healthcare is debateable.
The generic outsourcing literature suggests that the IT vendor marketplace has become more
diverse in recent years. The generic IT vendors target larger firms and combine a range of IT and
management capabilities and skills. More specialist IT vendors target specific industrial sectors
(i.e. investment banking, hotel and catering) or applications (i.e. SAP, payroll systems). Feeny,
Lacity & Willcocks (2006) identify three potentially critical areas of provider competency listed
below:
• Delivery competency: the extent to which the supplier is equipped to deliver service to
specification on a sustainable basis.
• Transformation competency: the scope of supplier ability to achieve radical
improvements in the quality, cost, and functionality of the outsourced service.
• Relationship competency: the ability of the supplier to work in true partnership with the
client, with aligned incentives operating through the life of the contract.
The National Programme incorporates all three of these wide-ranging competencies, as the
various IT systems are not only designed for process improvement but also for process and work
practice transformation.
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Strategic Partnerships
IT outsourcing contracts often euphemistically refer to strategic partnerships, more as an
aspiration than a tangible outcome. Lacity and Willcocks (2006) point out the essential elements
of a strategic partnership to include sharing risks and rewards, as well as creating synergies from
complementary competencies. While the general public is being made to believe that the National
Programme encourages strategic partnerships between the NHS and IT vendors (Mohan, 2002),
how this is expected to work in practice is still a topic of much debate. One impediment to
formulating a strategic partnership is the different working environment of these sectors, with
private sector firms attempting to maximise their profits, and public sector NHS organisations
focusing upon the needs of their patients. Our findings show that the National Programme is
unlikely to close the gap between this divide. The perception that IT vendors are earning high
profits from working with the NHS is likely to cause consternation, particularly if the ‘cashstrapped’ NHS cannot afford to provide front-line patient services.
Procurement Contracts
Most sourcing models show evidence of an inherent adversarial nature in the contract wherein the
client covers the costs of all expenditure incurred by the supplier (Lacity & Willcocks, 2006). In
the case of the National Programme the procurement of IT services has been shrouded in secrecy
and defined as ‘commercially sensitive’ and ‘confidential’. While Connecting for Health advises
that it has followed rigorous private sector ‘best practices’ in the negotiation and signing of the
various contracts (Table 2), secondary source data suggests that many problems exist, notably
because the ‘tight’ contracts leave little room for the IT vendors to re-negotiate terms and
conditions. Further, the fulfilment of the various deliverables and targets is dependent upon the
co-operation of the organisation where the IT work is carried out, which may not be the same as
the client organisation.
While the procurement contracts offered by Connecting for Health are tightly coupled and legally
binding, IT outsourcing is a commercial relationship, which must satisfy the needs of both client
and vendor. IT vendors that are unable to fulfil a commercial contract, either through shareholder
pressure (McNulty & Ferlie, 2004) or because of resistance from NHS staff in accepting new IT
systems (Currie & Guah, 2007) may decide to terminate a contract. This will lead to negative
publicity and possibly legal action.
Governance Systems
The governance systems surrounding healthcare are highly organised and comprise public and
private sector organisations employing both regulatory and normative controls over the activities
conducted within the field of healthcare services. In the UK, three sets of principal players
participate in the governance system (Guah & Currie, 2005):
i)
Governance agencies use their regulatory powers to exercise control over the materialresource environment and the value system.
ii)
The doctor/patient relationship has become highly institutionalised, with the doctor
relying on their professional knowledge, expertise and judgement to advice an
essentially ‘passive’ patient about treatment options.
iii)
More recently, patients are advised to exercise their rights to participate in healthcare
governance systems. This has been encouraged by the UK government in its aim to
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give patients ‘more choice’. A recent example has been where certain drugs have only
been available to patients on the grounds of where they live, rather than for medical
need. This has occurred because shortfalls in NHS hospital budgets have led some
senior executives to refuse drug treatments to patients on the grounds of cost, with the
fallout played out in the media as a story about treatment being offered according to a
‘post-code lottery’ rather than on medical need (Pollack, 2005; Webster, 2002).
The above concepts are central to our understanding of how the healthcare system adopts and
adapts to changes in the material-resource environment and the beliefs, rules and ideas which
comprise the value system within which vendors from the private sector must do business.
THE RESEARCH STUDY
Our study on the UK National Health Service began in 2001 at a time of heightened activity in
this sector. As far back as 1998, the Department of Health produced a strategy document which
committed the NHS to lifelong electronic health records, ‘for everyone, with around the clock,
on-line access to patient records and information about best clinical practice for all NHS
clinicians’ (Connecting for Health, 2004). This culminated in the NHS plan in 2000, which
outlined a vision of healthcare service designed around the patient and a new delivery system.
By 2001, another report was produced which outlined the information systems needed to deliver
the NHS plan and support patient-centered care and services. The following year saw the
Wanless Report (2002) published which offered several key recommendations for IT in the NHS.
The report advocated an increase in IT investment, stringent, centrally managed national
standards for data and IT, and better management of IT implementation in the NHS, including a
national programme. Later in 2002, another report was published – ‘Delivering 21st Century IT
Support for the NHS – A National Strategic Programme’ (Department of Health, 2002). Within it
contained the plan for the governance system to create a Ministerial Taskforce and recruitment of
a director general for the National Programme for Information Technology. In addition, it set up
the Clinical Care Advisory Group, with representatives from many healthcare organisations. The
main task for this group was the recommendation to create an NHS Care Record for each patient,
with core information held in a national data repository. By October 2002, the National
Programme was launched with the appointment of a Director General of NHS IT (Table 1). The
purpose was to ‘procure, develop and implement modern, integrated IT infrastructure and
systems for all NHS organisations in England by 2010’ (Connecting for Health, 2004).
As a longitudinal study on the UK healthcare system, it was imperative that a research method
was compatible with our objective to identify and understand the institutional environment of
healthcare delivery. More specifically, we were keen to identify and explain the observed
changes in the diversity of supplier base, the vendor management issues, and also the governance
systems designed to facilitate the introduction of the National Programme. Three broad research
questions were developed: 1) How can we identify and delineate the key vendor groups and
individual actors which comprise National Service Providers and local service providers (LSPs)?
2) What are the defining business logics prevailing within and across the NHS in relation to the
National Programme and change programmes more generally? 3) Who are the key players in

2151

determining the vendors deliver what was promised under the National Programme?
As an exploratory-descriptive study, we selected to interview a variety of individuals working
within the organisational field of healthcare. This included, government ministers, professional
groups within healthcare, NHS clinicians and administrators, and external IT suppliers involved
in the National Programme.
A literature review of the healthcare arena identified a number of studies on policy issues, yet few
which systematically and rigorously examined how change management programs were adopted
and diffused throughout the healthcare sector. Whereas many studies considered the introduction
of a change programme, usually involving IT, within a specific organisational setting (Brown,
2001), there were limited studies that examined vendor management between different
constituents in the adoption and diffusion of IT systems (i.e. government agencies, NHS
executives, hospital trusts, IT suppliers and patients). Most of the studies were descriptive and
lacked an historical dimension. Further, many of the studies on the introduction of medical
systems were not supported by a robust theoretical framework, and instead were more narrowly
aimed to identify examples of best practice.
Data collection and analysis
Three methods of data collection were adopted. First, the researchers assembled a range of
academic, government and industry studies on the healthcare sector. These studies were not
restricted to the UK only, but included articles and reports on healthcare services in many
countries, regions and locations. This material proved invaluable for understanding some of the
societal, economic, political, cultural and technical differences in healthcare nationally and
internationally. Second, we attended various trade fairs, conference, workshops and exhibitions
on healthcare. Some of these events were focused on general topics (i.e. IT in healthcare, patient
services, hospital management and professional best practice), with others more focused upon
specific activities (i.e. the National Programme, presentation of the Wanless Report, IT strategy
for NHS). These events generated many useful research contacts. Third, we engaged in primary
data collection, where 120 interviews were conducted with a range of constituents (i.e. health
service professionals and administrators, clinicians, doctors, patients, IT service providers, and
politicians).
An open-ended and semi-structured interviews schedule was used to enable interviewees to
expand on their answers. This method of data collection was critical for allowing interviewees to
raise additional themes, issues and concerns that they felt were important to the research study.
Interviews with respondents took place over a three-year period. Most of the interviews lasted
around two hours. The interviews at the NHS hospitals were tape-recorded and the tapes were
transcribed. Respondents were sent a transcript of the interview to verify it was an acceptable
account of what was discussed. Any errors were corrected. Since some of the interview content is
politically contentious, many interviewees asked for themselves and their NHS hospitals to retain
their anonymity.
The open-ended and semi-structured interviews were conducted during the first four years of the
National Programme project implementation, part of which was the negotiation of contracts to
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the service providers. Multiple informants were interviewed both within the NHS hospitals and
with other constituents. During the first year of interviews, the scope of the study was extended
as it was important to elicit data and information from a wider range of respondents engaged in
the implementation of the National Programme. These included, IT service firms bidding for
public sector IT contracts (Table 1) and doctors in general practice (external to the NHS
hospitals). Respondents from IT service firms offered critical insights into the political and
procurement processes within the NHS and public sector more generally (see comments by
Project Manager of IT Vendor below). GPs offered useful insights about the communication
channels underpinning the vendor responsibilities.
Following the first year of interviews, the researchers evaluated the data and refined the semistructured interview schedule. It was recognized that given the range of constituents involved in
the National Programme, the questionnaires needed to be more closely targeted to the
professional and personal situation of the individual, as generic questions were less meaningful.
The comments and insights from respondents were further compared with the policy documents
and reports from government sources.
CASE STUDY: THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR IT
Healthcare in the UK is a highly complex environment with the NHS providing patient services
to around 60 million citizens, free at the point of delivery. The NHS was created by a
parliamentary act initiated by the Labour government following a national healthcare review after
World War II. The current NHS organisation consists of parliament, a secretary of state for
health, strategic health authorities, under which NHS trusts, foundation trusts, primary care trusts,
care trusts and non-NHS organisations reside. An independent regulator that monitors these
organisations reports to parliament.
The past six decades has witnessed the NHS experiencing periods of both stability and change.
As a highly institutionalised environment, the NHS has developed a ‘public sector ethos’ infused
with the values of serving the public. Clinicians and healthcare workers have placed these values
above issues of finance and cost effectiveness as treatment has been provided based upon medical
need rather than ability to pay. Over the years, the NHS has developed many institutionalised
mechanisms that make change difficult and often highly controversial, such as the powerful
professional bodies which govern the conduct and performance of clinicians (McNulty & Ferlie,
2004). Successive governments have introduced policy documents to modernize the NHS with
varying levels of success. One area has been in the use of information and communications
technology, as a means to enhance efficiency and performance. Healthcare is an information-rich
business with 15% of hospital resources spent on gathering information. Doctors and nurses are
estimated to spend up to 25% of their time collecting and using information (Audit Commission,
1995).
The proliferation of new entrants into the healthcare organisational field was a consequence of
changing government policies over six decades. During the era of professional dominance,
healthcare workers, particularly clinicians, enjoyed a level of freedom to define and structure
their working practices. This extended to choices about the types of technology adopted and
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diffused across the NHS. As a new era emerged in the 1970s, which embraced managerialism as
a way to enhance efficiency and performance, the healthcare system was increasingly inundated
with various managerial fads and panaceas, like BPR and change management (Willcocks and
Currie, 1997). An outcome of these interventions was that isomorphic structures across the NHS
were increasingly threatened, as NHS managers were keen to demonstrate ‘best practice’
examples through the adoption of the latest management ideas. Implicit in this logic was that the
NHS organisations that had not embraced ‘new ideas’ ran the risk of being labeled as ‘against
modernization’ or, at worst, ‘failing institutions’.
Governance Structure for the National Programme
Up till the mid-90, the NHS governance structure for IT was decentralized or division-based,
although decisions about organisational-wide IT projects remained centralized at the level of the
government and NHS Executive. IT divisions were spread across several regional authorities,
with medical functions centrally controlled. This precluded many small IT service firms from
gaining a foothold in the NHS, as only their larger counterparts had the political, organisational
and technical capacity to deliver large-scale IT work. In the late 1990’s, the government
increasingly recognized the opportunity to use IT to improve the delivery of service within the
NHS. After a series of reviews of NHS IT service delivery, a more integrated and seamless IT
organisation was recommended (Department of Health, 2000; Wanless, 2002). An IT Director
commented,
‘If you compare banking and the NHS, IT systems tend to be standardized in banking but
non-standardised in the NHS. IT in the NHS has grown from the bottom up, and this is now
creating problems for the National Programme, which is trying to create a uniform
approach to IT across the NHS’.
The governance structure for the National Programme operates at three levels with defined
reporting lines and links to other groups. At the top level, the Department of Health (DoH)
Departmental Management Board (DMB), chaired by the DoH permanent secretary, provides
governance. This is the senior decision-making body within the DoH and is the National
Programme sponsor. The Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) is the DoH Group Director for
Delivery who is a member of the DMB and who chairs the National Programme Board Executive
which is an executive sub-group attended by all SROs for individual programmes and work
streams. On a day-to-day basis, the management of the National Programme is the responsibility
of the operational management team, chaired by the Chief Operating Officer, who reports to the
National Programme Board and it’s Executive, and also chairs the National Supplier Board.
Other agencies involved in auditing and reviewing the National Programme are part of the
programme governance structure. These include HM Treasury, the National Audit Office and the
Office of Government Commerce, all of which are represented on the National Programme
Board. The Cabinet Office Committee, which reviews the ongoing progress of all large-scale IT
projects, also plays a role.
The Nationwide Programme is structured around regional clusters following consultation with
Strategic Health Authorities. After much discussion, England was split into five geographic
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regions - each cluster comprising between five to seven SHAs – to would work together on the
procurement and implementation of the National Programme services at local level. Five LSPs
deliver applications at a local level. The LSPs work closely with local NHS IT professionals and
are overseen by a Regional Implementation Director (RID) from the National Programme. The
LSPs ensure that existing local systems are compliant with national standards and that data are
able to flow between local and national systems. To do this, the National Programme plans to
deliver upgrades or replacements to hardware and software as appropriate and implement core
local training for NHS staff. All RIDs lead the implementation process across their individual
areas. RIDs manage the National Programme support team and the relationship with the supplier,
as well as co-ordinating deployment. A RID is part of the National Programme team and reports
to the National Programme implementation director, but is also responsible to the cluster board
for delivery. This arrangement, however, created difficulties for the IT vendors as per this
observation:
“We believe the National Programme will delivery benefits to both national and local
authorities resulting from investment in the provision of technology that will be released
through parallel investments in implementation and changes to local working practices.
Although practical value may differ and lead to different conclusions about investment
opportunities, the consequence of the local IT infrastructure or lack of past investment in
IT, the local priorities for new investment may not align with a national emphasis. We have
observed certain instances where the contractual commitments made in relation to the
deployment of IT are not always aligned with the timing of local initiatives or other
projects developments.
Present government policy offers a mix of centralized initiatives such as the National
Programme, alongside devolution of power and responsibility through initiatives such as
the delegation of decisions over a very large proportion of NHS funds down to local
Primary Care Trusts and the creation of foundation hospitals. Yet this apparent dichotomy
is coherent. Greater standardization of some processes will provide greater freedom for
others. As an example one of the more extreme examples of the devolution of power - the
provision of choice to individual patients to select their care provider - will be dependent
on the successful implementation of a common national software application as much as it
will through local investments in new facilities and services.” Project Manager of IT
Vendor.
The magnitude of the National Programme suggested the need for a formalised governance
structure. Yet interviews with a range of respondents identified serious shortcomings:
‘The formal structure is intended to clarify roles and responsibilities which are standard
practice in any large-scale IT implementation. However, the current structure is not
permanent as the government is planning to reduce strategic health authorities to only
nine. This will have significant implications to decision-making structures as many chief
executives will either be out of a job or moved to another role. It is very difficult to
implement IT change when things keep changing’. IT Director.
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The on-going changes in the formal structure of the NHS only exacerbated these problems with
two identifiable negative outcomes (Heathfield, Pitty, & Hanka, 1998). First, NHS staff described
the situation as ‘change management fatigue’ as they sought to interpret new and revised
government policy. Many staff were concerned that structural changes did little to increase
efficiency and performance, and instead contributed to low morale. Second, structural changes
produced confusion and contradictions, as NHS staff struggled to interpret new institutional
logics against existing institutional logics. For example, a Director of ICT at one hospital said,
‘In the past, the hospital was owned by the state. Now that we are part of the private
finance initiative (PFI), the buildings are privately owned. If someone wants a new socket
in their wall, I can no longer go and fit one in. I have to ask the leaseholders of the building
to do this, and the cost is five times as much. This changes relationships within the
organisation as everyone is either a provider or purchaser in this internal market’.
The move from a less formal governance structure to one which emphasised market mechanisms
through the continuation of policies which set up the ‘internal market’ was not interpreted by
NHS staff as a positive outcome. Rather, NHS staff described their working practices as being
imbued with the values of service and compassion. To undertake roles and tasks on the basis of
cost and efficiency criteria were against these core values. The Director of ICT continued his
point,
‘The internal market which started in the 1970s was more about reducing waste and
increasing operational efficiency. But now, we have moved towards an external market,
where even the buildings and other capital equipment is owned by private firms. The
current delays in the National Programme, such as Choose & Book, reflect all the
problems of dealing with contractors and sub-contractors. I am not sure that we have
become more efficient in this new regime. Personally, I think that NHS staff did a lot of
things in the past for which they were never properly rewarded. Nowadays, if the private
firms mess up, they still seem to get paid’.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper has considered the development and early implementation of a large-scale IT-enabled
change programme throughout the NHS in England. Using institutional theory as a lens to
interpret our data, we consider the changing organisational field of healthcare, the prevailing
institutional logics and the governance systems that both encourage and facilitate organisational
and technical change.
Our findings highlight the increasingly complex organisational field that comprises the healthcare
environment. Such complexity employs what is now described as a ‘kaleidoscopic workforce’
with about one quarter of primary care delivered by agency staff (Gray, 2006) with only the
patient seen as a constant within the NHS. Like other initiatives within healthcare, the National
Programme is designed and implemented by more than one bureaucracy, which suggests that
delineating roles and responsibilities becomes increasingly difficult.
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Against a backdrop of continuous change in the NHS, the National Programme is currently
halfway through its planned implementation. It is too early to predict whether the National
Programme will achieve its overall aims and objectives, but our findings suggest that while the
government and media have narrowly focused upon its technical deliverables, a significant
challenge is to win the hearts and minds of those who are expected to adopt the various
technologies of the National Programme. As a large-scale IT project, the National Programme is
consistently missing the original performance targets (Hendy et al, 2005; NAO, 2006). While this
is not unusual for IT-enabled projects, the National Programme is not simply about installing new
hardware and software, but requires a significant change in the working practices of clinicians
and administrators. Politicians describe the National Programme as a knowledge-based
programme, where information sharing is a fundamental outcome measure. However, our
findings suggest that such a goal is naïve as professional groups such as clinicians and IT firms
perceive knowledge as something to be protected and secured, not available for public or
competitor consumption.
The current delays and shortcomings of systems such as Choose & Book are not merely confined
to technical blips, but extend to poor communication between those who seek to impose this
system and the various user groups it is intended to serve. A simple solution is to increase
communication between the stakeholders in the form of additional workshops to fuel dialogue
about the delivery and implementation of the various aspects of the National Programme. Several
initiatives towards achieving this objective are currently being sponsored by Connecting for
Health (NAO, 2006). A more fundamental and intransigent problem, however, was highlighted
by the various respondents and concerned conflicting institutional logics.
In an era of increased marketisation, privatization and commercialisation (Pollock, 2005), one of
the significant challenges facing the National Programme is to reconcile competing institutional
logics emanating within an organisational field which has become increasingly fragmented over
time. Past logics espousing the virtues of the public sector ethos, professionalism and selfregulation, continue to collide with a private sector ethos, which is sanctioned by government
policy and regulation to enhance performance and efficiency within the NHS. But this conflict
continues to pose problems as clinicians reconcile competing interests among NHS managers and
patients. More recent logics have compounded the problem, as the concept of the internal market
has been externalized and now encompasses a new vision for ‘patient choice’ to enhance the
‘public value’ of government controlled services (Moore, 1995).
Against these changes, defining the aims and objectives of the National Programme has become
increasingly difficult, as conflicting and contradictory logics circulate within the organisational
field of healthcare. This is continuously being played out in the media as the high cost of the
National Programme is often discussed in the context of a zero-sum game, in that scarce
resources could be spent on ‘more pressing public needs’ such as treatment and drugs, rather than
technology. The growing accent upon nurturing a ‘patient centred ethos’, where citizens play an
active role in choosing and managing their own healthcare needs (including access to their own
on-line patient records), will serve to generate new logics about the role and purpose of
technology.
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This research study has addressed a range of broad questions in relation to the National
Programme. Using vendor analysis, we recognize our research has many limitations that are
germaine to this theoretical perspective. Two important limitations are given here. First, our
study adopts a conceptually broad analysis using concepts of vendor field, institutional logics and
governance systems. Within each LSP arrangement, there are variations in the dominant
institutional logics and governance systems. Specific vendors will therefore espouse different
priorities and policies pertaining to service delivery policies, healthcare agencies, internal
management and administrative structures and even post-implementation support. While our
research has not attempted to compare and contrast the major application service providers from
which data was collected, future research may seek to identify variations in the material-resource
environment and value systems between vendors. Second, another limitation of adopting this type
of outsourcing theory perspective is the absence of ‘quality of service’ in the interpretation of our
data. In many studies in the healthcare systems, the quality of patient data is emphasized in
leading and managing large-scale IT-enabled hospital change programmes. We recognize that
although we convey the values, comments and opinions of various respondents, we do not seek to
measure or evaluate their impact or role within the Connecting for Health to its vendors. Further
research may therefore focus upon the individual role of specific vendors in delivering the aims
and objectives of the National Programme for the purposes of comparative analysis of different
vendor performance outcomes. This is likely to become increasingly relevant where further
fragmentation of healthcare results in highly differentiated healthcare delivery.
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TABLE 1: Original companies that expressed interest in bidding for National Programme in 2002

99 COMPANIES – EXPRESSION OF INTEREST
ASC ComputerSoftware

AME International

CSC

IBM

Hiperworld Cybertech

Avaya UK

Atlantic Global

Anite Public Sector

Centerprise

Hiperworld Cybertech

BDS Solutions

Attenda

Bearing Point Inc

Chameleon Info Mgment Service

Holdcare Consortium

Damovo UK

Bridge Systems

Computerland

Civica Service

Imtech Uk

Futjitsu

Cerner

Corporate Solutions

Communications Advisory Service

Indigo 4 Systems

HP (UK)

CTG Inc

Consulting (UK)

Healthtrio

Infermed

Lason Systems

Information Group (UK)

CSE-Servelec

ISC Computer

InHealth Solutions

Logica

Lockheed Martin

McKesson/Capita

Kingston Comms

Integrated Medical Solutions

Micor Warehouse

Lucent Technologies

MLL Telecon

OE Group (Stone Computers

Loghar

PlexusCare

Omnetica

Pars Technology

Patient First Alliance

Logica

Quest Software UK

Patni Computer Systems

McKesson/Capita

Service & Systems Solutions Parity Computers
Simon Management

Plato Health Systems

Ramesys (e-Business)

Securicor Info Systems

Northrop Grumman

Southern Alliance

Redstone Communications

SAIC

Serco

Nucletron OSS

Stalis Ltd

Targetfour

Selection Services Plc

Specialist Computer Centres (SCC)

World Class Int.

Telewest

Viglen

Siemens

Wipro Tech.

Steria

Triple G Ltd

Xansa

Silversands

OLM Systems

Torex

Accenture

In4tek

Compuware

Ergo Computing UK

Quask AG

Beaufort Int.

Insight Direct (UK)

SciSys (Commerce & Industry)

Morgan Chambers

Everlogic

BT Syntegra

iSoft

Cap Gemini Ernst & Young

CACI

Kelvin Connect

TABLE 2: Major vendors on the National Programme
MAJOR VENDORS - National Programme
• NASP purchasing & integrating nationally
• LSP delivering IT systems & services locally
CONTRACTS (DEC-2004)
SERVICE PROVISION
Care Records Service – NASP
National
Care Records Service – LSP
North East
Care Records Service – LSP
Eastern
Care Records Service – LSP
London

PROVIDER
British Telecom
CSC
Accenture
Capital Care Alliance
(British Telecom)
Care Records Service – LSP
North West & West Midlands CSC
Care Records Service – LSP
Southern
Fujitsu Alliance
National Network for the NHS (N3) National
British Telecom
Choose and Book
National
Atos Origin
Contact (email)
National
Cable & Wireless
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LENGTH
10 years
10 years
10 years
10 years
10 years
10 years
7 years
5 years
10 years

